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Pratt (1964) and Yaari (1969) contain the classical results pertaining to the
equivalence of various notions of comparative risk aversion of von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities in the setting with real-valued outcomes. Some of these
results have been extended to the setting with outcomes in <n. We obtain ana-
logues of the classical results in the setting with outcomes in ordered topological
vector spaces when diﬀerentiability is not required, and in the setting with out-
comes in ordered Hilbert spaces when diﬀerentiability is required, as is the case
when we work with a vector-valued generalized notion of an Arrow-Pratt coeﬃ-
cient.
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Consider a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u : O ! <, where O ½ < is
the sets of outcomes. Let ∆(O) be the set of all probability measures (also called lotteries)
on O. u is said to be risk averse (Pratt 1964, Arrow 1971) if it always rejects every










for every non-degenerate lottery ¹ 2 ∆(O). By Jensen’s inequality, this property is equiv-
alent to u being strictly concave.
The salient formalizations of the notion that “a risk averse utility function u is more
risk averse than a risk averse utility function v” are:
(a) every lottery accepted by u is accepted by v (Yaari 1969),
(b) the lottery dependent risk premia associated with u are weakly larger than the
corresponding risk premia associated with v (Pratt 1964),
(c) u = f ± v, where f is concave (Pratt 1964), and
(d) the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is everywhere weakly larger
for u than for v (Pratt 1964).
It is well-known (Pratt 1964, Yaari 1969) that, given appropriate regularity assump-
tions, these criteria yield the same partial ordering of the set of risk averse utility functions.
The classical theory described above has been extended to vector space settings with
O ½ <n (Stiglitz 1969, Kihlstrom and Mirman 1974, Duncan 1977, Karni 1979, 1989),
where n is a positive integer.1 As in the classical setting, Jensen’s inequality is used to
characterize a risk averse utility function as strictly concave. The essential diﬀerence
between the setting with n = 1 and the setting with n > 1 is that, in the former setting all
increasing utility functions induce the same ordering on O, while in the latter setting this
coincidence of orderings induced by increasing utility functions does not obtain. Kihlstrom
and Mirman (1974) show that, if n > 1 and the risk aversion of utility functions u and
v is comparable using deﬁnitions analogous to the above-mentioned notions, then u and
v must induce the same ordering on O. This property, which we shall refer to as ordinal
congruence, amounts to saying that in the vector outcome setting utility functions with
comparable risk aversion must have the same level sets.
The technical approach used in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) to extend the classical
theory to the setting with n > 1 is to reduce the problem to the classical setting and then
1exploit the classical results. Given a utility function, risk premia are deﬁned for lotteries
with ‘skinny’ supports, i.e., lotteries whose supports are contained in 1-dimensional aﬃne
subspaces intersecting O. They also construct Yaari-type acceptance sets using simple
lotteries, i.e., lotteries with ﬁnite supports. Propositions 1 and 2 in Kihlstrom and Mirman
(1974) demonstrate that the partial ordering of risk averse utility functions generated by
(b) is equivalent to the partial ordering generated by (c) when the lotteries whose risk
premia are considered belong to the ‘skinny’ class described above. Proposition 6 in that
paper demonstrates that the partial ordering of risk averse utility functions generated by
(a) is equivalent to the partial ordering generated by (c) when the lotteries considered for
inclusion in the acceptance sets are simple. Some of these results have been generalized to
arbitrary real vector spaces by Peters and Wakker (1987).
Our aim in this paper is to stretch the above-described theory in two directions. First,
we wish to incorporate in our theory all lotteries in ∆(O), not only the simple lotteries and
lotteries with skinny supports. Secondly, we wish to consider outcome spaces O that are
more general than those considered in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974). These objectives
create the following dilemma. On the one hand, we wish to embed O in as general a
vector space as possible, like in Peters and Wakker (1987). On the other hand, we need
to compute expectations with respect to general lotteries over O, not only of real-valued
utility functions, e.g., the integral on the right-hand-side of (1.1), but also of vector-
valued mappings, e.g., the integral on the left-hand-side of (1.1). In the case of simple
lotteries, computing these expectations is a straightforward matter of computing ﬁnite
convex combinations of real numbers or vectors. For general lotteries, computing these
expectations requires the outcome space to support the approximation and continuity
arguments involved in the relevant method of integration. Another technical requirement
of the theory is that the outcome space must be (partially) ordered so that the vector-
valued risk premia generated by characterization (b) can be compared.
Our proposal for satisfying the above-listed desiderata is to embed O in a partially
ordered real locally convex topological vector space. Given this setting, the integral on
the right-hand-side of (1.1) will be the abstract Lebesgue integral, while the integral on
the left-hand-side of (1.1) will be the Pettis integral. Using this setting, we show that
characterizations (a), (b) and (c) are equivalent, with the deﬁnition of (b) modiﬁed to deal
with the set-valued nature of risk premia in the vector outcome setting. Unlike in the
proofs of analogous results in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), diﬀerentiability of the utility
function is not required, and unlike the results in Peters and Wakker, our utility functions
2are real-valued, i.e., not allowed the values 1 or ¡1.
In Duncan (1977), the deﬁnition of a risk premium vector is the ﬁrst step in the
derivation of a vector analogue of the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.
We generalize the deﬁnition of an Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion to the
setting of an ordered Hilbert space. In this setting, we show that characterizations (c) and
(d) are equivalent.
Our generalization of the theory of comparative risk aversion suggests some natural
applications which were hitherto beyond the scope of the formal theory. For instance,
consider O = C(<+;<), with an outcome x 2 O interpreted as the continuous sample
path of a security’s value. A lottery in this setting is a probability measure over the
set of continuous sample paths. With appropriate assumptions, such measures describe
diﬀusions, which are the formal elements of much of modern asset pricing theory.2
We begin our analysis by stating some preliminary deﬁnitions and results in Section 2.
These results are used in Section 3 to establish a generalized version of Jensen’s inequality
that is appropriate for our setting and purposes. This inequality is used to characterize
risk averse utility functions as strictly concave functions in our setting. In Section 4,
Deﬁnitions 4.5, 4.9 and 4.10 deﬁne binary relations º1, º2 and º3 respectively on U,
which is the set of risk averse utility functions; these relations correspond to the classical
notions of comparative risk aversion (a), (b) and (c) respectively. Theorem 4.15 is the
ﬁrst substantive result of this paper. It shows that, in an appropriate setting, º1, º2
and º3 are equivalent. In Section 5, we consider a more restrictive setting that allows the
notion of diﬀerentiability to be used. In this context, we deﬁne a generalized notion of the
Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Using this notion, we deﬁne relation º4
on U corresponding to the classical notion (d) of comparative risk aversion. Theorem 5.5
is the second substantive result of this paper. It shows that, in an appropriate setting, º3
and º4 are equivalent.
2. Technical preliminaries
We start with two versions of the supporting hyperplane theorem tailored for our pur-
poses. First, a convex set with nonempty interior is supported by a non-trivial hyperplane
at any point in its frontier.
Lemma 2.1. If
(a) C is a convex subset of a topological vector space L with IntC 6= ;, and
3(b) x 2 C ¡ IntC,
then there exists a non-zero continuous linear functional p : L ! < such that p(x) ¸ p(y)
for every y 2 C.
We use this result to generate a supporting (resp. strictly supporting) hyperplane at
any given point in the graph of a concave (resp. strictly concave) function.
Lemma 2.2. If
(a) C is a convex subset of a topological vector space L,
(b) u : C ! <+ is concave, and
(c) x 2 IntC,
then
(A) There exists a 2 < and a continuous linear functional b : L ! < such that
a + b(x) = u(x) and a + b(y) ¸ u(y) for every y 2 C ¡ fxg.
(B) If, in addition, u is strictly concave, then the inequality in (A) is strict.
We shall employ, without explicit comment, the following conventions throughout this
paper. First, a subset of a topological space is given the subspace topology. Secondly, a
topological space is given the Borel ¾-algebra, with B(Y ) denoting the Borel ¾-algebra of
a topological space Y . Thirdly, the set of real numbers < is given the Euclidean topology.
We endow the outcome space O with mathematical structure by making it a subset
of a space X with the features described in the following assumption. This assumption
applies throughout the rest of this paper with additional restrictions stated explicitly when
required.
Assumption 2.3. O is a nonempty subset of a real locally convex topological vector space
X. X¤ is the space of continuous real-valued linear functionals on X.
∆(O) is the set of probability measures on (O;B(O)). ¹ 2 ∆(O) is said to be non-
degenerate if there exists B 2 B(O) such that ¹(B) 2 (0;1). We wish to deﬁne the mean
of ¹ 2 ∆(O), i.e., give meaning to the integral
R
O ¹(dy)y. This will be done using the
notion of a Pettis integral.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Consider a probability space (Ω;F;P) and an F=B(X) measurable func-
tion x : Ω ! X. x is Pettis integrable3 over Ω if
(a)
R
Ω P(d!)x¤ ± x(!) exists for every x¤ 2 X¤, and
(b) there exists xΩ 2 X such that x¤(xΩ) =
R
Ω P(d!)x¤ ± x(!) for every x¤ 2 X¤.
4If x is Pettis integrable over Ω and xΩ is unique, then we refer to xΩ as the Pettis integral
of x over Ω and denote it by
R
Ω P(d!)x(!).
Remark 2.5. X¤ is a total space of linear functionals on X (Dunford and Schwartz 1988,
Corollary V.2.13), i.e., if x 2 X is such that x¤(x) = 0 for every x¤ 2 X¤, then x = 0.
Therefore, if x is Pettis integrable over Ω, then xΩ is uniquely determined.
We shall use the Pettis integral to deﬁne
R
O ¹(dy)I(y), where ¹ 2 ∆(O) and I : O !
X is the identity function. This entails the following problem: ﬁnd xO 2 X such that
x¤(xO) =
R
O ¹(dz)x¤(z) for every x¤ 2 X¤. Although this problem is a special case of
Deﬁnition 2.4, the general problem of Deﬁnition 2.4 can be reduced to the problem of
solving the special problem. To see the reason for this, note that
R
Ω P(d!)x¤ ± x(!) =
R
x(Ω) P ± x¡1(dz)x¤(z) for every x¤ 2 X¤. Thus, the integrals characterizing xΩ can be
calculated by integrating the identity function over x(Ω) using the image measure P ±x¡1.
We provide the details in Remark A.1 in the Appendix.
A second issue is whether there are general settings in which functions are Pettis
integrable. In Remark A.2 of the Appendix, we identify a general class of settings in which
Pettis integrals exist.
The following is a generalized version of the classical Jensen’s inequality. We shall use
it to characterize risk averse utility functions. The proof is an application of Lemma 2.2.
Theorem 2.6. (Jensen’s inequality)4 If
(a) O is convex,
(b) ¹ 2 ∆(O) is such that, given (O;B(O);¹), the identity function I : O ! X is
Pettis integrable over O and
R
O ¹(dy)y 2 IntO, and









(B) If u is strictly concave and ¹ is non-degenerate, then the inequality in (A) is strict.
If X = <, then the Pettis integral in (A) reduces to the generalized Lebesgue integral,
thereby yielding the classical Jensen’s inequality.
3. Risk averse utility functions
Deﬁnition 3.1. ∆(O)0 is the set of ¹ 2 ∆(O) such that m¹ =
R
O ¹(dy)y exists and
m¹ 2 O.
5A preference is risk averse if it strictly prefers the mean m¹ of a non-degenerate lottery
¹ to the lottery itself. More formally, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.2. u : O ! < is said to be risk averse if
(a) u is B(O)=B(<) measurable, and
for every non-degenerate ¹ 2 ∆(O)0,
(b)
R




Note that the property of being risk averse is invariant across equivalent von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility representations of the same preference.
Remark 3.3. If u : O ! < is risk averse and v = a + bu, with a 2 < and b 2 <++, then
v is risk averse.
The following result provides suﬃcient conditions for a utility function to be risk
averse.
Theorem 3.4. If
(a) O is open and convex, and




O ¹(dy)u(y) exists for every ¹ 2 ∆(O)0, and
(B) u is risk averse.
Proof. (A) Consider ¹ 2 ∆(O)0. By deﬁnition and (a),
R
O ¹(dy)y exists and
R
O ¹(dy)y 2
O = IntO. By Theorem 2.6(A),
R
O ¹(dy)u(y) exists.
(B) Condition 3.2(a) is satisﬁed by hypothesis. Consider a non-degenerate ¹ 2
∆(O)0. By (A), condition 3.2(b) is satisﬁed. Moreover, Theorem 2.6(B) implies u(m¹) >
R
O ¹(dy)u(y), thereby satisfying condition 3.2(c).
4. Comparing risk aversion without diﬀerentiability
We start by imposing an ordering structure on X.
Assumption 4.1. ¸ is a partial order on X (i.e., ¸ is reﬂexive, transitive and antisym-
metric) such that
(a) x ¸ y implies x + z ¸ y + z for every z 2 X, and
(b) x ¸ y implies tx ¸ ty for every t 2 <++.
6Let x > y if and only if x ¸ y and x 6= y. Let X+ = fx 2 X j x > 0g. There exists e 2 X+
such that, for every x 2 X, there exists t 2 <++ such that te > x.
We say that u : O ! < is increasing if for all x;y 2 O, x > y implies u(x) > u(y). Let
U be the set of functions u : O ! < that are continuous, increasing, bounded below and
strictly concave.
Lemma 4.2. If u 2 U and O is open and convex, then
R
O ¹(dy)u(y) exists for every
¹ 2 ∆(O)0 and u is risk averse.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 3.4.
In this section, we shall study various methods of ordering the elements of U. Given
Lemma 4.2, these orderings can legitimately be interpreted as comparisons of risk aversion
of the elements of U if O is open and convex.
Deﬁnition 4.3. Given x 2 O and u 2 U, A(x;u) = f¹ 2 ∆(O)0 j u(x) ·
R
O ¹(dy)u(y)g
is called the acceptance set associated with x and u.
A(x;u) may be interpreted as the set of lotteries that utility function u would accept
(i.e., not reject) given the status quo outcome x. Note that acceptance sets are deter-
mined by the preference and are invariant across equivalent von Neumann-Morgenstern
representations of that preference.
Remark 4.4. If u 2 U and v = a + bu, where a 2 < and b 2 <++, then v 2 U and
A(x;u) = A(x;v) for every x 2 O.
Our ﬁrst notion of comparative risk aversion labels a risk averse von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility u as more risk averse than a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility v if every lottery accepted by u is accepted by v. In the light of Remark 4.4, this
amounts to comparing the risk aversion of the underlying preferences.
Deﬁnition 4.5. For all u;v 2 U, u º1 v if and only if A(x;u) ½ A(x;v) for every x 2 O.
We now deﬁne the notion of risk premia associated with a lottery ¹.










Unlike in the case of scalar outcomes, the set of risk premia, ¼(u;¹), is generally not a
singleton set. Nor is it necessary that they be positive vectors. We note a simple condition
on O that guarantees the non-emptiness of the set of risk premia.
7Lemma 4.7. If O is nonempty, convex and open in X, u 2 U and ¹ 2 ∆(O)0, then
¼(u;¹) 6= ;.
Proof. As O is convex, it is connected. As O is nonempty and connected, and u is
continuous, u(O) ½ < is nonempty and connected. Therefore, u(m¹) >
R
O ¹(dy)u(y) 2
u(O), i.e., there exists x(u;¹) 2 O such that u ± x(u;¹) =
R
O ¹(dy)u(y). Therefore,
¼(u;¹) 6= ; as m¹ ¡ x(u;¹) 2 ¼(u;¹).
We also note that risk premia are determined by preferences over lotteries, i.e., they are
invariant with respect to increasing aﬃne transformations of a von Neumann-Morgenstern
representation of the preference.
Remark 4.8. Suppose u 2 U and v = a + bu, where a 2 < and b 2 <++. Then, v 2 U
and ¼(u;¹) = ¼(v;¹) for every ¹ 2 ∆(O)0.
Our second notion of comparative risk aversion labels a risk averse von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility u as more risk averse than a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility v if a risk premium for v can never exceed a risk premium for u. In the light of
Remark 4.8, this amounts to comparing the risk aversion of the underlying preferences. In
order to formalize this notion, deﬁne the binary relation ¸¤ on 2X by: for all A;B 2 2X,
A ¸¤ B , :y > x; 8x 2 A 8y 2 B
Deﬁnition 4.9. For all u;v 2 U, u º2 v if and only if ¼(u;¹) ¸¤ ¼(v;¹) for every
¹ 2 ∆(O)0.
Our third notion of comparative risk aversion labels a risk averse von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility u as more risk averse than a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility v if u is an increasing concave transformation of v. Given B ½ <, we say that
f : B ! < is increasing if x;y 2 B and x < y implies f(x) < f(y).
Deﬁnition 4.10. For all u;v 2 U, u º3 v if and only if u = f ± v for some f : v(O) ! <
that is increasing and concave.
Theorem 4.15 is the ﬁrst substantive result of this paper. It shows that in a very
general setting, the three notions of comparative risk aversion listed above are equivalent.
We start with a deﬁnition and some preliminary lemmas.
8Deﬁnition 4.11. u : O ! < and v : O ! < are said to be ordinally congruent if, for all
x;y 2 O, u(x) ¸ u(y) if and only if v(x) ¸ v(y).
Lemma 4.12. If
(a) u;v 2 U are ordinally congruent, and
(b) x;y 2 O such that v(x) 6= v(y),
then there exists a 2 < and b 2 <++ such that a + bv(x) = u(x) and a + bv(y) = u(y).
Deﬁne w 2 U by w = a+bv. Then, A(x;w) = A(x;v) for every x 2 O and ¼(w;¹) = ¼(v;¹)
for every ¹ 2 ∆(O)0.
Proof. Set
a = u(x) ¡ bv(x) and b =
u(x) ¡ u(y)
v(x) ¡ v(y)
As u and v are ordinally congruent by (a), we have b > 0. The other claims follow from
Remarks 4.4 and 4.8.
Lemma 4.13. If u;v 2 U are ordinally congruent, then there exists a unique function
f : v(O) ! < such that u = f ± v; moreover, f is increasing.
Proof. For r 2 v(O), let f(r) = u ± v¡1(frg); by ordinal congruence, u is constant over
v¡1(frg). It follows that f ± v(x) = u ± v¡1(fv(x)g) = u(x) for every x 2 O. It is routine
to show that f is unique and increasing on v(O).
Lemma 4.14. If
(a) O is connected,
(b) u : O ! < is continuous and v : O ! <, and
(c) f : v(O) ! < is an increasing function such that u = f ± v,
then f is continuous.
Proof. Suppose f is discontinuous at v¤ 2 v(O). Let A = ff(r) j r 2 v(O)\(¡1;v¤)g and
B = ff(r) j r 2 v(O) \ (v¤;1)g. If v¤ 2 (inf v(O);supv(O)), then A 6= ; 6= B and either
f(v¤) < inf B or f(v¤) > supA. If v¤ = inf v(O), then A = ;, B 6= ; and f(v¤) < inf B. If
v¤ = supv(O), then A 6= ;, B = ; and f(v¤) > supA. So, there can be two cases: either
f(v¤) < inf B and B 6= ;, or f(v¤) > supA and A 6= ;. We show a contradiction in the
ﬁrst case. A contradiction can be derived for the second case in analogous fashion.
As f(v¤) < inf B, there exists ® 2 < such that f(v¤) < ® < inf B. Consider the
sets f ± v(O) \ (¡1;®) and f ± v(O) \ (®;1). Clearly, these sets are disjoint. As f is
increasing, their union equals f ± v(O). Clearly, f(v¤) 2 f ± v(O) \ (¡1;®). Moreover,
9; 6= B ½ f ± v(O) \ (®;1). Thus, these sets form a disconnection of f ± v(O) = u(O),
contradicting the facts that u is continuous and O is connected.
We are now ready to prove our ﬁrst main result.
Theorem 4.15. If
(a) O is nonempty, convex and open in X,
(b) x + X+ ½ O for every x 2 O, and
(c) u;v 2 U are ordinally congruent,
then u º1 v , u º2 v , u º3 v.




O ¹(dy)v(y) exist for every ¹ 2 ∆(O)0; moreover, u and v are risk averse. Secondly, by
Lemma 4.7, ¼(u;¹) 6= ; 6= ¼(v;¹) for ¹ 2 ∆(O)0. Thirdly, as O is convex, it is connected.
(i) Suppose :u º2 v. Then, :¼(u;¹) ¸¤ ¼(v;¹) for some ¹ 2 ∆(O)0. This
means ¼v > ¼u for some ¼u 2 ¼(u;¹) and ¼v 2 ¼(v;¹). As u is risk averse, u(m¹) >
R
O ¹(dy)u(y) = u(m¹ ¡ ¼u); clearly, m¹ 6= m¹ ¡ ¼u. Using Lemma 4.12, we assume
without loss of generality that v(m¹ ¡ ¼u) = u(m¹ ¡ ¼u). As ¹ 2 ∆(O)0,
Z
O




where the inequality follows from Assumption 4.1 and the fact that v is increasing. It
follows that ¹ 2 A(m¹ ¡ ¼u;u) and ¹ 62 A(m¹ ¡ ¼u;v). It follows that :u º1 v. Thus,
u º1 v implies u º2 v.
(ii) Suppose u º2 v. This means ¼(u;¹) ¸¤ ¼(v;¹) for every ¹ 2 ∆(O)0. Let x 2 O
and ¹ 2 A(x;u). Let ¼u 2 ¼(u;¹) and ¼v 2 ¼(v;¹).
Suppose v(x) = v(m¹ ¡ ¼v) =
R
O ¹(dy)v(y). Then, ¹ 2 A(x;v).
Suppose v(x) 6= v(m¹ ¡¼v). Using Lemma 4.12, we assume without loss of generality
that v(x) = u(x) and v(m¹ ¡ ¼v) = u(m¹ ¡ ¼v).
Suppose u(m¹ ¡ ¼u) > u(m¹ ¡ ¼v) and there exists r 2 X+ such that u(m¹ ¡ ¼u) =
u(m¹ ¡ ¼v + r). By deﬁnition,
R
O ¹(dy)u(y) = u(m¹ ¡ ¼u) = u(m¹ ¡ ¼v + r). Thus,
¼v 2 ¼(v;¹) and ¼v ¡ r 2 ¼(u;¹). As ¼v > ¼v ¡ r, we have :¼(u;¹) ¸¤ ¼(v;¹), a
contradiction.
Suppose u(m¹ ¡ ¼u) > u(m¹ ¡ ¼v) and there does not exist r 2 X+ such that
u(m¹ ¡ ¼u) = u(m¹ ¡ ¼v + r). By Assumption 4.1, A = ft 2 <+ j u(m¹ ¡ ¼u) <
u(m¹¡¼v+te)g 6= ;, and by hypothesis, 0 2 B = ft 2 <+ j u(m¹¡¼u) > u(m¹¡¼v+te)g.
10Thus, A and B are nonempty, A \ B = ; and A [ B = <+. As u is continuous, A and B
are open in <+. Thus, A and B are a disconnection of <+, a contradiction.
Therefore, u(m¹¡¼u) · u(m¹¡¼v), and it follows that v(x) = u(x) ·
R
O ¹(dy)u(y) =
u(m¹¡¼u) · u(m¹¡¼v) = v(m¹¡¼v) =
R
O ¹(dy)v(y). Thus, ¹ 2 A(x;v). Consequently,
A(x;u) ½ A(x;v) for every x 2 O. It follows that u º1 v.
(iii) By Lemma 4.13, there exists a unique function f : v(O) ! < such that u = f ±v;
moreover, f is increasing. By Lemma 4.14, f is continuous, and therefore, B(v(O))=B(<)
measurable. Suppose u º3 v. It follows that f is concave.
Consider x 2 O and ¹ 2 A(x;u). By deﬁnition, ¹ 2 ∆(O)0. It follows that m¹
exists, m¹ 2 O,
R
O ¹(dy)u(y) exists and u is risk averse. By deﬁnition,
R
O ¹(dy)f ±v(y) =
R
O ¹(dy)u(y) ¸ u(x) = f ± v(x).












¹(dy)f ± v(y) ¸ f ± v(x)
As f is increasing, we have
R
O ¹(dy)v(y) ¸ v(x). Thus, ¹ 2 A(x;v).
Suppose there does not exist v¤ 2 < such that v(y) = v¤ ¹-a.s. As v is continuous and
O is connected, v(O) is a connected subset of <, i.e., v(O) is an interval. Let ¯ v = supv(O)
and v
¯




v(O) ¹ ± v¡1(dz)z · ¯ v. If ¯ v 62 v(O), then









v(O) ¹ ± v¡1(dz)z = ¯ v, then v = ¯ v ¹-a.s., a contradiction. Thus,
R
v(O) ¹ ± v¡1(dz)z < ¯ v. By an analogous argument,
R




























¸ f ± v(x)
As f is increasing,
R
O ¹(dy)v(y) ¸ v(x), which implies ¹ 2 A(x;v). It follows that u º1 v.
(iv) By Lemma 4.13, there exists a unique function f : v(O) ! < such that u = f ±v;
moreover, f is increasing. By Lemma 4.14, f is continuous. Suppose :u º3 v. Thus, f is
not concave.
11Then, there exist v1;v2 2 v(O) and t 2 (0;1) such that f(tv1 + (1 ¡ t)v2) < tf(v1) +
(1¡t)f(v2). As v(O) ½ < is connected, tv1+(1¡t)v2 2 v(O); moreover, as f is continuous,
f ± v(O) is connected. Without loss of generality, suppose v1 < v2. As f is increasing,
f(v1) < f(v2). Thus, f(tv1 + (1 ¡ t)v2) < tf(v1) + (1 ¡ t)f(v2) < f(v2).
As tv1 + (1 ¡ t)v2 2 v(O) and v2 2 v(O), we have
[f(tv1 + (1 ¡ t)v2);f(v2)] ½ f ± v(O)
Consequently, there exists v¤ 2 v(O) such that
f(tv1 + (1 ¡ t)v2) < f(v¤) < tf(v1) + (1 ¡ t)f(v2)
By deﬁnition, there exist x1;x2;y 2 O such that v(x1) = v1, v(x2) = v2 and v(y) = v¤.
Thus,
u(y) = f ± v(y) = f(v¤) < tf(v1) + (1 ¡ t)f(v2)
= tf ± v(x1) + (1 ¡ t)f ± v(x2)
= tu(x1) + (1 ¡ t)u(x2)
As f is increasing, we have
tv(x1) + (1 ¡ t)v(x2) = tv1 + (1 ¡ t)v2 < v¤ = v(y)
Deﬁne ¹ 2 ∆(O) by ¹ = t±x1 + (1 ¡ t)±x2, where ±xi is the Dirac delta measure at xi.
Then,
R
O ¹(dx)u(x) = tu(x1) + (1 ¡ t)u(x2) > u(y). Consequently, ¹ 2 A(y;u). Also,
R
O ¹(dx)v(x) = tv(x1) + (1 ¡ t)v(x2) < v(y), i.e., ¹ 62 A(y;v). It follows that :u º1 v.
Thus, u º1 v implies u º3 v.
In Theorem 4.15 and the lemmas leading up to it, we have used the notion of ordinal
congruence. The following result formalizes in our setting the observation, Proposition 5
of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), that ordinal congruence is necessary in order to compare
the risk aversion of utility functions.
Theorem 4.16. If
(a) O is convex,
(b) x + X+ ½ O for every x 2 O, and
(c) u;v 2 U are not ordinally congruent,
then :u º1 v and :v º1 u.
Proof. As u and v are not ordinally congruent, there exist x;y 2 O such that u(x) ¸ u(y)
and v(x) < v(y). Using (b) and (c), we may, without loss of generality, assume that
12u(x) > u(y) and v(x) < v(y). Consider ¹ = ±x=2 + ±y=2. Clearly, ¹ 2 Av(x) and
¹ 62 Au(x). Thus, :v º1 u. Similarly, ¹ 62 Av(y) and ¹ 2 Au(y). Thus, :u º1 v.
5. Comparing risk aversion with diﬀerentiability
The fourth notion of comparative risk aversion, which is the most important from the
point of view of applications and computations, is in terms of the size of the Arrow-Pratt
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. As this notion involves diﬀerentiable utilities, it cannot
be deﬁned in as general a setting as that of Section 4. However, the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient
deﬁned for X = < and the generalized measure of Duncan deﬁned for X = <n can be
generalized to the setting where X is a Hilbert space with appropriate ordering structure.
Once this is done, the classical result can be re-formulated. We specialize Assumptions 2.3
and 4.1 by giving X and ¸ more speciﬁc forms.
Assumption 5.1. (X;h:;:i) is a real Hilbert space with X 6= f0g, inner product h:;:i, and
a Hilbert basis fbi j i 2 Ig.5 For x 2 X, we say that x ¸ 0 if hx;bii ¸ 0 for every i 2 I; we
say that x > 0 if x ¸ 0 and x 6= 0. Let X+ = fx 2 X j x > 0g. For x;y 2 X, we say that
x ¸ y if x ¡ y ¸ 0. Finally, there exists e 2 X+ such that, for every x 2 X, there exists
t 2 <++ such that te > x.
Note that fbi j i 2 Ig ½ X+ as the family is orthonormal. Therefore, kbik =
hbi;bii1=2 = 1 for every i 2 I. It is also trivial to check that ¸ is a partial order on
(X;h:;:i) that satisﬁes Assumption 4.1; the antisymmetry of ¸ follows immediately from
the fact that fbi j i 2 Ig is a total family in (X;h:;:i). Also, it is easily conﬁrmed that
X+ [ f0g is a convex cone.
Consider a twice diﬀerentiable u 2 U. The (Fr´ echet) derivative of u is a mapping
Du : O ! L(X;<), where L(X;<) is the space of continuous linear real-valued functionals
on X. The second derivative of u is the derivative of Du, i.e., D2u : O ! L(X;L(X;<)),
where L(X;L(X;<)) is the space of continuous linear maps from X to L(X;<). As X is
a Hilbert space, L(X;<) is isomorphic to X (Lang 1993, Theorem V.2.1). Thus, we may
set D2u : O ! L(X;X).





In the case X = <, this formula reduces to the classical Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient. As
D2u(x) 2 L(X;X) and Du(x) 2 X, it follows that au(x) 2 X.
13Deﬁnition 5.2. For all u;v 2 U, u º4 v if and only if au(x) ¸ av(x) for every x 2 O.
Consider u;v 2 U that are ordinally congruent. By Lemma 4.13, there exists a unique
function f : v(O) ! < such that u = f ± v; moreover, f is increasing. By Lemma 4.14, f
is continuous. We now establish some other regularity properties of f.
Lemma 5.3. If
(a) O ½ X is nonempty and open,
(b) x + X+ ½ O for every x 2 O, and
(c) u;v 2 U are twice diﬀerentiable and ordinally congruent,
then there exists a unique function f : v(O) ! < such that u = f ± v; moreover, f is
increasing and twice diﬀerentiable.
Proof. By Lemma 4.13, there exists a unique function f : v(O) ! < such that u = f ± v.
Moreover, f is increasing and by Lemma 4.14, f is continuous. We show that f is twice
diﬀerentiable.
Fix x 2 O. As O is open, there exists t 2 (0;1] such that x ¡ te 2 O; otherwise,
x ¡ e=n 2 X ¡ O for every n 2 N, which implies x 2 X ¡ O as X ¡ O is closed, a
contradiction. Deﬁne ¯ e = te > 0. Let E = fy 2 O j x ¡ ¯ e < y < x + ¯ eg. Deﬁne
w : (0;2) ! < by w(r) = v(x ¡ ¯ e + r¯ e). As ¯ e > 0 and v is increasing, w is increasing. As
v is continuous, w is continuous. Moreover, (c) implies that w is twice diﬀerentiable. Let
w¡1 be the function inverse of w. Clearly, w¡1 is increasing, and by the inverse function
theorem, twice diﬀerentiable.
Also note that w((0;2)) = v(E). Clearly, w((0;2)) ½ v(E). Suppose there exists
r 2 v(E)¡w((0;2)). Consider the sets w¡1((¡1;r)) and w¡1((r;1)). Clearly, these sets
are nonempty and disjoint. As w is continuous, these sets are open subsets of (0;2). As
r 62 w((0;2)), we have (0;2) ½ w¡1((¡1;r)) [ w¡1((r;1)). Thus, (0;2) is disconnected,
a contradiction.
Deﬁne Á : v(E) ! < by Á(r) = u(x¡¯ e+w¡1(r)¯ e). Consider y 2 E. Then, v(y) 2 v(E)
and Á ± v(y) = u(x ¡ ¯ e + w¡1 ± v(y)¯ e). As w((0;2)) = v(E), there exists r 2 (0;2) such
that v(y) = w(r) = v(x ¡ ¯ e + r¯ e). Consequently,
Á ± v(y) = u(x ¡ ¯ e + w¡1 ± w(r)¯ e) = u(x ¡ ¯ e + r¯ e) = u(y)
where the last equality follows from ordinal congruence of u and v and the fact that
v(y) = v(x ¡ ¯ e + r¯ e). Thus, f coincides with Á on v(E). As u and w¡1 are twice
diﬀerentiable, so is Á, and therefore, f.
14Lemma 5.4. If
(a) (X;h:;:i;¸) satisﬁes Assumption 5.1,
(b) O ½ X is nonempty and open,
(c) x + X+ ½ O for every x 2 O, and
(d) u 2 U is diﬀerentiable,
then Du(x) > 0 for every x 2 O.
Proof. Let fbi j i 2 Ig be the Hilbert basis used to deﬁne ¸. Then, fbi j i 2 Ig ½ X+.
Consider x 2 O, t 2 (0;1) and i 2 I. Using (c), x + bi 2 O. As bi > 0 and ¸ is a partial
order, tbi > 0. Using (c), x+tbi 2 O. As u 2 U, u(x+bi) > u(x) and u is strictly concave.
Therefore, u(x + tbi) ¡ u(x) > t[u(x + bi) ¡ u(x)] for every t 2 (0;1). Therefore, (b), (d)
and the fact that kbik = 1 imply
t[u(x+bi)¡u(x)] < u(x+tbi)¡u(x) = thDu(x);bii+tkbikr(tkbik) = thDu(x);bii+tr(t)
where limt#0 r(t) = 0. Dividing by t and taking limits as t # 0, we have hDu(x);bii ¸
u(x + bi) ¡ u(x) > 0. As this holds for every i 2 I, (a) implies Du(x) ¸ 0. Clearly,
Du(x) 6= 0. Thus, Du(x) > 0.
Theorem 5.5. If
(a) (X;h:;:i;¸) satisﬁes Assumption 5.1,
(b) O ½ X is nonempty, convex and open in X,
(c) x + X+ ½ O for every x 2 O, and
(d) u;v 2 U are twice diﬀerentiable and ordinally congruent,
then u º3 v , u º4 v.
Proof. As the conditions of Lemma 5.3 are satisﬁed, there exists a unique function f :
v(O) ! < such that u = f ± v. Moreover, f is increasing and twice diﬀerentiable.
Using the chain rule, we have Du(x) = Df(v(x)) ± Dv(x) for every x 2 O, i.e.,
hDu(x);yi = Df(v(x))hDv(x);yi = hDf(v(x))Dv(x);yi
for every x 2 O and y 2 X. Thus, Du(x) = Df(v(x))Dv(x) for every x 2 O. By Lemma
5.4, Du(x) > 0 and Dv(x) > 0 for every x 2 O. Thus, Df(v(x)) > 0 for every x 2 O. By
an analogous argument,
D[Df(v(x))] = D[Df ± v(x)] = D2f(v(x))Dv(x)
15Using the product formula to diﬀerentiate the identity Du(x) = Df(v(x))Dv(x), we have
D2u(x)y = hD[Df(v(x))];yiDv(x) + Df(v(x))D2v(x)y
= hD2f(v(x))Dv(x);yiDv(x) + Df(v(x))D2v(x)y
= D2f(v(x))hDv(x);yiDv(x) + Df(v(x))D2v(x)y
for every y 2 X. By Lemma 5.4, kDu(x)k > 0 and kDv(x)k > 0. Setting y = Du(x),















Re-arranging and using the deﬁnition of the generalized Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient, we have




Suppose u;v 2 U and u º3 v. By deﬁnition, there exists an increasing and concave
function f : v(O) ! < such that u = f ± v. By Lemma 5.3, f is twice diﬀerentiable. By
the above argument, Df > 0. By Lemma 5.4, Dv(x) > 0. As f is concave and twice
diﬀerentiable, D2f · 0. Thus, (5.6) implies that av(x) ¡ au(x) · 0 for every x 2 O, i.e.,
u º4 v.
Conversely, suppose u º4 v. Then, av(x) ¡ au(x) · 0 for every x 2 O. By Lemma
5.3, there exists a unique function f : v(O) ! < such that u = f ± v, and f is increasing
and twice diﬀerentiable. As Df > 0 and Dv > 0, it follows from (5.6) that D2f(v(x)) · 0
for every x 2 O. Thus, f is concave on v(O) and u º3 v.
16Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1. By hypothesis, fxg and IntC are nonempty and disjoint sets.
Theorem V.2.1 in Dunford and Schwartz (1988) implies that IntC is convex and C ½ IntC.
By the separating hyperplane theorem (Dunford and Schwartz 1988, Theorem V.2.8), there
exists a non-zero continuous linear functional p : L ! < such that p(x) ¸ p(y) for every
y 2 IntC. Consider y 2 C ¡ IntC. As C ½ IntC, we have y 2 IntC; consequently, there
exists a net (yi)i2I ½ IntC converging to y. As yi 2 IntC, we have p(x) ¸ p(yi). As
limi yi = y and p is continuous, we have p(x) ¸ p(y), as required.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. (A) Given the product topology, L£< is a topological vector space.
(a) and (b) imply that H = f(y;z) 2 C£< j z · u(y)g is a convex set. (x;u(x)) 2 H¡IntH
as (x;u(x) + 1=n) 2 (C £ <) ¡ H for every n 2 N. As (b) implies that (x;¡1) 2 IntH,
we have IntH 6= ;.
Lemma 2.1 implies that there exists a non-zero continuous linear functional p : L£< !
< and ° 2 < such that p(x;u(x)) = ° ¸ p(y;z) for every (y;z) 2 H. Linearity of p implies
that p(y;z) = p(y;0)+p(0;z) for every (y;z) 2 L£<. Deﬁne ® : L ! < by ®(y) = p(y;0)
for y 2 L, and let ¯ 2 < be such that p(0;z) = ¯z for z 2 <. Clearly, ® is a continuous
linear functional on L. It follows from the deﬁnitions of ® and ¯ that
®(x) + ¯u(x) = ° ¸ ®(y) + ¯z
for every (y;z) 2 H. In particular, ° ¸ ®(y) + ¯u(y) for every y 2 C.
Suppose ¯ = 0. As p is non-zero, ® is non-zero and ®(x) = ° ¸ ®(y) for every
y 2 C ¡ fxg. As ® is non-zero, there exists x0 2 L such that ®(x0) > 0. Consequently,
x0 6= 0. By (c), x is an interior point of C. Therefore, x is an internal point of C (Dunford
and Schwartz 1988, Theorem V.2.1). Then there exists r > 0 such that x+rx0 2 C ¡fxg.
Therefore, ° ¸ ®(x + rx0) = ®(x) + r®(x0) > ®(x) = °, which is a contradiction.
Suppose ¯ < 0. Then (x;¡n) 2 H for every n 2 N. As ¯ < 0, there exists N 2 N
such that ¡¯N > ° ¡ ®(x). Thus, ®(x) ¡ ¯N > °, which contradicts (x;¡N) 2 H.
Thus, ¯ > 0. Set a = °=¯ and b = ¡®=¯. The result follows.
(B) Suppose there exists y 2 C ¡fxg such that a+b(y) = u(y). Then, x=2+y=2 2 C
and a+b(x=2+y=2) = [a+b(x)]=2+[a+b(y)]=2 = u(x)=2+u(y)=2 < u(x=2+y=2), which
is a contradiction.
17Remark A.1. Consider a probability space (Ω;F;P) and an F=B(X) measurable func-
tion x : Ω ! X. Set O = x(Ω). If the identity function I : O ! X is Pettis integrable
over O with respect to the probability space (O;B(O);P ±x¡1), then x is Pettis integrable
over Ω with respect to (Ω;F;P).
Proof. Suppose I : O ! X is Pettis integrable over O with respect to the probability
space (O;B(O);P ± x¡1). Consider x¤ 2 X¤. By deﬁnition, x¤ ± I : O ! < is B(O)=B(<)





Ω P(d!)x¤ ± x(!) =
R
O P ± x¡1(dz)x¤(z) exists.
Finally, there exists xO 2 X such that x¤(xO) =
R
O P ±x¡1(dz)x¤(z) =
R
Ω P(d!)x¤±x(!)
for every x¤ 2 X¤. Set xΩ = xO. It follows that x is Pettis integrable over Ω.
Remark A.2. Let Y be a separable Banach space with closed unit sphere S. Let X = Y ¤
and endow it with the Y topology. Let O be the closed unit sphere of X, i.e., O = fx 2
X j supy2S jx(y)j · 1g. We show that the identity function I : O ! X is Pettis integrable
with respect to the probability space (O;B(O);¹).
Proof. It is easily conﬁrmed that O is convex. By Alaoglu’s theorem (Dunford and
Schwartz 1988, Theorem V.4.2), O is compact. As Y is separable, O is metrizable (Dunford
and Schwartz 1988, Theorem V.5.1). Consequently, O is separable.
Deﬁne the evaluation mapping e : X £ Y ! < by e(x;y) = x(y). Clearly, fe(:;y) j
y 2 Y g is a total space of linear functionals on X. As this is the space of linear functionals
used to deﬁne the Y topology on X, fe(:;y) j y 2 Y g is the set of continuous linear
functionals on X (Dunford and Schwartz 1988, Theorem V.3.9). Consider y 2 Y . As
e(:;y) is continuous, e(:;y) is B(X)=B(<) measurable. Also, I is B(O)=B(X) measurable.
Therefore, e(:;y)±I is B(O)=B(<) measurable. Moreover, I and e(:;y) are continuous. As
O is compact, e(:;y) ± I is bounded. Therefore,
R




Finally, we show that there exists x 2 O such that e(x;:) =
R
O ¹(dz)e(z;:). Deﬁne
F : O ! <Y by F(x) = e(x;:), where <Y is given the product topology. Thus, our problem
is to show that F(x) =
R
O ¹(dz)e(z;:) for some x 2 O.
As F is linear and continuous, F(O) is convex and compact. As < is Hausdorﬀ, so
is <Y , and therefore F(O) is closed. First, consider ¹ 2 ∆(O) with supp¹ < 1. It
follows that
R
O ¹(dz)e(z;:) = e(
R
O ¹(dz)z;:). As O is convex,
R
O ¹(dz)z 2 O. Thus,
R
O ¹(dz)e(z;:) = F(
R
O ¹(dz)z) 2 F(O). Now consider an arbitrary ¹ 2 ∆(O). Endow
∆(O) with the weak
¤ topology. As O is separable metric, f¹ 2 ∆(O) j supp¹ < 1g
18is dense in ∆(O) (Parthasarathy 1967, Theorem II.6.3). It follows that there exists a




O ¹(dz)e(z;:) = limj
R
O ¹j(dz)e(z;:). By the above
argument,
R





O ¹j(dz)e(z;:) 2 F(O).
Proof of Theorem 2.6. (A) Let u
¯
2 < be a lower bound for u(O). Deﬁne v : O ! <
by v(y) = u(y) ¡ u
¯
. Clearly, v is concave, B(O)=B(<) measurable and v(y) ¸ 0 for every
y 2 O. Clearly, it suﬃces to show that (A) and (B) hold for v instead of u.
Let
R
O ¹(dy)y = x. Assumptions (a), (b) and (c) ensure that the assumptions of
Lemma 2.2 are satisﬁed. Applying Lemma 2.2, there exists a 2 < and x¤ 2 X¤ such that
a + x¤(x) = v(x) and a + x¤(y) ¸ v(y) for y 2 O ¡ fxg. As v is B(O)=B(<) measurable,
and a + x¤(:) ¸ v(:) ¸ 0, and
R
O ¹(dy)[a + x¤(y)] = a +
R
O ¹(dy)x¤(y) exists by (b), it
follows that
R
O ¹(dy)v(y) exists. It follows that










The second equality follows from (b).
(B) As ¹ is non-degenerate, there exists B 2 B(O) such that ¹(B) 2 (0;1). Without
loss of generality, let x 2 O ¡B. By Lemma 2.2(B), a+x¤(y) > u(y) for every y 2 B. As



























The second equality follows from (b).
19Notes
1. A distinct line of research (Grant, Kajii and Polak 1992a and 1992b, Spence and
Zeckhauser 1972) studies the relationship between multivariate risk (lotteries over com-
modity bundles) and univariate risks (lotteries over wealth) when the two are linked by
a budget constraint. It considers questions such as: In what ways can preferences over
multivariate lotteries generate preferences over univariate lotteries? How do the proper-
ties of preferences in the multivariate setting map to the properties of preferences in the
univariate setting? What can be inferred about preferences in the multivariate setting if
we know the properties of preferences in the univariate setting?
2. For instance, the Wiener measure on the sample space of continuous real-valued
functions deﬁned on the non-negative real numbers results in the coordinate process be-
coming the Wiener process. This process is the building-block for geometric Brownian
motion, a process routinely used to model price movements in the theory of asset-pricing.
Itˆ o and McKean (1965) is a classic reference for the mathematics of diﬀusions. For an
introduction to the economic applications, see Duﬃe (1988).
3. See Pettis (1938) for the original statement of the theory. We are using a less
restrictive version of the original deﬁnition.
4. For other general variants of this inequality, see for instance, Perlman (1974).
5. See Lang (1993) for details. Existence of a Hilbert basis follows from Corollary
V.1.7 in Lang (1993).
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